



Approved For Release 2003/05/06 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001000170004-1

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

WASHINGTON

This document consists of 2 pages.

Number 1 of 9 copies, for es it

October 19, 1961

SECRET

Dear Allen:

I recently convened a panel of consultants to undertake a general review of current United States disarmament policy. After reviewing existing policy and examining our latest disarmament proposal, the panel explored and subsequently developed a somewhat modified approach for possible consideration in future negotiations. This approach both amplifies and supplements the United States disarmament plan presented by the President to the United Nations on September 25, 1961. Its principal features are: (1) a primary and immediate emphasis on the control and reduction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; (2) a progressive zonal system of inspection which relates the degree of inspection and intrusion to the amount of disarmament achieved; and (3) negotiations initially between those countries which possess large numbers of nuclear delivery vehicles and extended to other countries and armaments in subsequent stages. A copy of the proposed program is attached.

Such a program would have a far-reaching effect on U.S. national security policy, but I believe it is sufficiently promising to merit careful examination. Consequently, I have requested Bob McNamara and Glenn Seaborg to provide an evaluation of the program from the Defense Department and AEC points of view respectively.

In addition, assistance from the Intelligence Community is virtually indispensable to adequate evaluation of the proposals. It seems to me that such comments might involve at least two general areas of intelligence competence: (1) estimation of Soviet strategic nuclear

The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles, Director,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington 25, D. C.

SECRET

STATE review(s) completed.

SECRET

-2-

delivery and production capabilities, AICBM deployment, production and deployment aspects of conventional forces, as well as the detection of indirect aggression and subversion; and (2) definition and preliminary evaluation of inspection techniques and systems for the arms control measures contained in the program. However, I would equally appreciate receiving your views as to any other aspects of the proposal in which you feel the Intelligence Community has an interest.

25X1 In order to give special attention to the inspection implications of the proposal, I have asked [redacted] 25X1 [redacted] a member of this staff on loan from the CIA, to organize a study group with representation from other interested agencies. In addition to your agency, this group should probably include the following organizations: Defense Research and Engineering, DOD; Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, DOD; Defense Intelligence Agency, DOD; and the Office of the President's Advisor for Science and Technology. It is hoped that the Group, meeting one or two times weekly, can complete its work by the end of the year.

In order to do this, I would like to ask if CIA could be represented somewhat as follows, with participants having TS, Q, S.I. and T security clearances:

25X1 (a) Office of Scientific Intelligence, by [redacted] or some similarly qualified person who has participated in past arms control study efforts.

(b) The Photographic Intelligence Center.

25X1 (c) The Clandestine Service, by [redacted] 25X1 from the DDP area, who has rendered significant assistance to prior efforts of this type.

25X1 [redacted] 25X1 [redacted]

The work of the Study Group will be divided into three consecutive phases. The first phase will be devoted

SECRET

SECRET


-3-

to an examination of the capabilities of the intelligence community to support United States participation in Western inspection activities during Stages A, B, and C of the program; the second to a consideration of the specific inspection techniques which may be applicable to the measures provided in the program; and the third to a preliminary examination of potential inspection systems which would be required in order to implement the proposed measures, including a delineation of problems which must be the subject of subsequent research efforts in depth. Throughout all phases, the operating procedure of the Group will involve assignment of work on subject areas to members having special competence. These individuals, supported by their organizational staffs, will be responsible for organizing information and developing proposals for review and discussion by the Group during weekly conferences.

A detailed agenda, terms of reference and related staff material will be provided members of the Group shortly after their designation. It is expected that the Inspection Study Group will begin its task by the latter part of this month.

CIA has provided valuable assistance to disarmament activities at all levels during the past few years. I look forward to a broadening of this relation in the future as we endeavor to develop our arms control and disarmament program.

Sincerely,



William C. Foster
Director

Enclosure:

Foster Panel Proposed
Disarmament Program,
dated October 12, 1961.

SECRET